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Abstract. Starting with the deontic principles in Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts we
introduce a new deontic logic. We use general proof-theoretic methods to
obtain a cut-free sequent calculus for this logic, resulting in decidability,
complexity results and neighbourhood semantics. The latter is used to
analyse a well known example of conflicting obligations from the Vedas.
1 Introduction
We provide a first bridge between formal logic and the Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ school of Indian
philosophy. Flourishing between the last centuries BCE and the 20th century,
the main focus of this school is the interpretation of the prescriptive part of
the Indian Sacred Texts (the Vedas). In order to explain “what has to be done”
according to the Vedas, Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors have proposed a rich body of deontic,
hermeneutical and linguistic principles (metarules), called nya¯yas, which were
also used to find rational explanations for seemingly contradicting obligations.
Even though the Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ interpretation of the Vedas has pervaded almost
every other school of Indian philosophy, theology and law, little research has been
done on the nya¯yas. Moreover, since not many scholars working on Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ are
trained in formal logic, and the untranslated texts are inaccessible to logicians,
these deontic principles have not yet been studied using methods of formal logic.
In this paper starting from the deontic nya¯yas we define a new logic – basic
Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ deontic logic (bMDL for short) – that simulates Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ reasoning.
After introducing the logic as an extension of modal logic S4 with axioms ob-
tained by formalising these principles 3 and providing a cut-free sequent calculus
and neighbourhood-style semantics for it, we use bMDL to reason about a well
known example of seemingly conflicting obligations contained in the Vedas. This
example concerns the malefic sacrifice called S´yena and proved to be a stumbling
block for many Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ scholars. The solution to this controversy provided by
⋆ Supported by FWF START project Y544-N23, FWF project V400 and EU
H2020-MSCA grant 660047.
3 While some of the nya¯yas we consider are listed in the Appendix of [13], we extracted
the remaining ones directly from Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts, see [6].
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the semantics of bMDL turns out to coincide with that of Prabha¯kara, one of
the chief Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors, which previous approaches failed to make sense of,
e.g., [18]. Our formal analysis relies essentially on the cut-free calculus for bMDL
introduced with the aid of the general method from [16].
Through the paper we refer to the following Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts: the Pu¯rva Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯
Su¯tra (henceforth PMS, ca. 3rd c. BCE), its commentary, the S´a¯barabha¯s. ya
(S´Bh), the main subcommentary, Kuma¯rila’s Tantrava¯rttika (TV).
Related work. Logic (mainly classical) has already been successfully used to
investigate other schools of Indian thought. In particular for Navya Nya¯ya formal
analyses have contributed to a fruitful exchange of ideas between disciplines [8],
however, no deontic modalities were considered. A logical analysis of the deontic
aspects of the Talmud, another sacred text, is given in [1]. The deontic logic used
there is based on intuitionistic logic and contains an external mechanism for
resolving conflicts among obligations. Deontic logics similar but not equivalent
to bMDL include Minimal Deontic Logic [9] and extensions of monotone modal
logic with some versions of the D axiom [12,17]. The latter papers also introduce
cut-free sequent calculi, but do not mix alethic and deontic modalities.
2 Extracting a deontic logic from Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts
The use of logic to simulate Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ ways of reasoning is motivated by their
rigorous theory of inference and attention for possible violations of it. For in-
stance Kuma¯rila, one of the chief Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors, emphasises the fact that
a text is not epistemically reliable if the whole chain of transmission is reliable,
but not its beginning. The classical example is that of “a chain of truthful blind
people transmitting information concerning colours” (TV on PMS 1.3.27).
At this point, the problem amounts to which logic should be adopted. The
simplest logical system for dealing with obligations is Standard Deontic Logic
SDL, that extends classical logic by a unary operator O read as “It is obligatory
that...” satisfying the axioms of modal logic KD [2,7]. Though simple and well
studied, SDL is not suited to deal with conflicting obligations, which are often
present in the Vedas and in Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ reasoning. A well known example from
the Vedas consists of the following norms concerning the malefic S´yena sacrifice,
which is enjoined in case one desires to harm his enemy, since it kills them:
A. “One should not harm any living being”
B. “One should sacrifice bewitching with the S´yena”
Any reasonable formalisation of the statements A. and B. leads in SDL to a
contradiction. Given that the Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors embraced the principle of non-
contradiction and invested all their efforts in creating a consistent deontic sys-
tem, to provide adequate formalisations of Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ reasoning a different logic
is needed. To this aim we introduce basic Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ deontic logic (bMDL) by
extracting its properties directly from Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts.
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The language of bMDL extends that of classical logic with the binary modal
operatorO(·/·) from dyadic deontic logics and the unary modal operator  of S4.
While the latter is used to formalise the auxiliary conditions of general deontic
principles, the former allows us to impose conditions on obligations describing
the situation in which the obligation holds. Hence a formula O(ϕ/ψ) can be read
as “ϕ it is obligatory given ψ”.
The use of the dyadic operator, which is a reasonably standard approach to
avoid the problem with conflicting obligations (see, e.g., [11] and [9]), is also
suggested in the metarule “Each action is prescribed in relation to a responsible
person who is identified because of her desire” (cf. PMS 6.1.1–3).
As described in Sec. 2.1 the properties of the deontic operatorO(·/·) of bMDL
(definition below) are directly extracted from the nya¯yas.
Definition 1. Basic Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ deontic logic bMDL extends (any Hilbert system
for) S4 with the following axioms (taken as schemata):
(1) ((ϕ→ ψ) ∧O(ϕ/θ))→ O(ψ/θ)
(2) (ψ → ¬ϕ)→ ¬(O(ϕ/θ) ∧ O(ψ/θ))
(3) (((ψ → θ) ∧ (θ → ψ)) ∧ O(ϕ/ψ))→ O(ϕ/θ)
The choice to use classical logic as base system, in contrast to the use of intu-
itionistic logic in Gabbay et al.’s deontic logic of the Talmud [1], is due to various
metarules by Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors implying the legitimacy of the reductio ad absur-
dum argument RAA; these include the following (contained in Jayanta’s book
Nya¯yaman˜jar¯ı): “When there is a contradiction (ϕ and not ϕ), at the denial of
one (alternative), the other is known (to be true)”. Therefore, if we deny ¬ϕ
then ϕ holds, which gives RAA.
2.1 From Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ nya¯yas to Hilbert axioms
Axiom (1) arises from three different principles, discussed in [6]; among them
the following abstraction of the nya¯yas in the Tantrarahasya IV.4.3.3 (see [5])
If the accomplishment of X presupposes the accomplishment of Y, the
obligation to perform X prescribes also Y.
This principle leads to ((ϕ→ ψ)∧O(ϕ/θ))→ O(ψ/θ), where we represent the
accomplishment of X and Y as ϕ and ψ respectively, and we stipulate that the
conditions on the two prescriptions, represented by θ, are the same. Note that
we use the operator , here as well as in the following axioms, to guarantee that
the correlations between formulae are not accidental.
Axiom (2) arises from the so-called principle of the half-hen, which is im-
plemented in different Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ contexts (e.g., TV on PMS 1.3.3); an abstract
representation of it is:
Given that purposes Y and Z exclude each other, if one should use item
X for the purpose Y, then it cannot be the case that one should use it
at the same time for the purpose Z.
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This principle stresses the incongruity of enjoining someone to act in
contradiction with himself on some object. The corresponding axiom is
(ψ → ¬ϕ)→ ¬(O(ϕ/θ) ∧ O(ψ/θ)) which guarantees that if ϕ and ψ exclude
each other, then they cannot both be obligatory under the same conditions θ.
Finally, Axiom (3) arises from a discussion (in S´Bh on PMS 6.1.25) on the eligi-
bility to perform sacrifices (see [6]), which can be abstracted as follows:
If conditions X and Y are always equivalent, given the duty to perform
Z under the condition X, the same duty applies under Y.
We formalise this principle as (((ψ → θ) ∧ (θ → ψ)) ∧ O(ϕ/ψ)) → O(ϕ/θ),
where the conditions X and Y are represented by ψ and θ respectively, and ϕ
represents that the action Z is performed.
While the properties of O(·/·) are taken from Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts, the same
cannot be done for  because Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors do not conceptualise necessity
as separate from epistemic certainty. The established choices for a logic for the
alethic necessity operator  are S4 and S5. To keep the system as simple as
possible, and not having found any principle motivating the additional properties
of S5, we have chosen S4.
3 Proof Theory of bMDL
Hilbert systems are convenient ways of defining logics, but are not very useful
for proving theorems in and about the logics (e.g., decidability, consistency).
For this purpose we introduce a cut-free sequent calculus GbMDL for bMDL
and use it to show that, for certain issues, bMDL simulates Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ ways
of reasoning. As usual, a sequent is a tuple Γ ⇒ ∆ of multisets of formulae
interpreted as
∧
Γ →
∨
∆. To construct GbMDL we use the translation from
axioms to rules and the construction of a cut-free calculus from these rules
from [15,16]. Since the latter is not fully automatic, we provide some details.
First, by [16, Thm. 26], we automatically obtain from Def. 1(1)-(3) the rules
ϕ, ψ ⇒ χ ⇒ ϕ, ψ χ⇒ ϕ θ ⇒ ξ ξ ⇒ θ
ϕ,O(ψ/θ)⇒ O(χ/ξ)
Mon′
ϕ, θ ⇒ ξ ϕ, ξ ⇒ θ ⇒ ϕ, θ, ξ θ, ξ ⇒ ϕ ψ ⇒ χ χ⇒ ψ
ϕ,O(ψ/θ)⇒ O(χ/ξ)
Cg
ϕ, ψ, χ⇒ ⇒ ϕ, ψ ⇒ ϕ, χ θ ⇒ ξ ξ ⇒ θ
ϕ,O(ψ/θ),O(χ/ξ)⇒
D′
2
From these rules we construct a new set of rules saturated under cuts from
which the rules above are derivable. This step is not automatic and amounts
to repeated cutting between rules [16, Def. 7]: given any two rules we obtain a
new rule whose conclusion is the result of a cut on a formula principal in the
conclusions of both rules, and whose premisses contain all possible cuts between
the premisses of the original rules on the variables occurring in this formula. We
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Γ ⇒ ϕ
Γ ⇒ ϕ,∆
4
Γ,ϕ,ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ,ϕ⇒ ∆
T
Γ, ϕ⇒ θ Γ, ψ ⇒ χ Γ, χ⇒ ψ
Γ,O(ϕ/ψ)⇒ O(θ/χ), ∆
Mon
Γ, ϕ⇒
Γ,O(ϕ/ψ)⇒ ∆
D1
Γ, ϕ, θ ⇒ Γ, ψ ⇒ χ Γ, χ⇒ ψ
Γ,O(ϕ/ψ),O(θ/χ)⇒ ∆
D2
Fig. 1. The modal rules rules of GbMDL
Γ ⇒ ∆
Γ,Σ ⇒ ∆,Π
W
Γ, ϕ, ϕ⇒ ∆
Γ,ϕ⇒ ∆
ConL
Γ ⇒ ϕ,ϕ,∆
Γ ⇒ ϕ,∆
ConR
Γ ⇒ ϕ,∆ Σ,ϕ⇒ Π
Γ,Σ ⇒ ∆,Π
Cut
Fig. 2. The structural rules
start from the set containing the rules above and those of S4 and first cut the
rules 4 (Fig. 1) with Mon′ and 4 with Cg on the boxed formula to obtain the
rules
Γ, ψ ⇒ χ θ ⇒ ξ ξ ⇒ θ
Γ,O(ψ/θ)⇒ O(χ/ξ), ∆
Γ, θ ⇒ ξ Γ, ξ ⇒ θ ψ ⇒ χ χ⇒ ψ
Γ,O(ψ/θ)⇒ O(χ/ξ), ∆
where Γ is obtained from Γ by deleting every occurrence of a formula not of
the form ϕ. Now cutting these two rules in either possible way yields the rule
Mon (Fig. 1), and cutting this and 4 with D′
2
yields D2. We obtain D1 closing
D2 under contraction, i.e., identifying ϕ with θ and ψ with χ and contracting
conclusion and premiss.
The sequent calculus GbMDL consists of the rules in Fig. 1 together with
the standard propositional G3-rules (with principal formulae copied into the
premisses) [14] and the standard left rule for the constant ⊥. We write ⊢GbMDL
Γ ⇒ ∆ if Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable using these rules. We denote extensions of GbMDL
with structural rules from Fig. 2 by appending their names, collecting ConL
and ConR into Con. E.g., GbMDLConW is GbMDL extended with Contraction and
Weakening.
By construction [15,16] we have:
Theorem 1. The rule Cut is admissible in GbMDLConW.
Proof. Using the structural rules the system GbMDLConW is equivalent to the
system GbMDL
′ConW in which the principal formulae of the propositional rules
and the rule T are not copied into the premisses. By construction (and straight-
forward inspection in the non-principal cases) the rules of GbMDL
′ConW satisfy
the general sufficient criteria for cut elimination established in [15,16]. Cut-free
derivations in GbMDL
′ConW are converted into cut-free derivations in GbMDLConW
using the structural rules. ⊓⊔
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The methods in [15,16] now automatically yield also an EXPTIME-complexity
result. However, we consider an explicit proof search procedure for GbMDL which
will be used in Sec. 4. First we establish some preliminary results.
Lemma 1. The Contraction and Weakening rules are admissible in GbMDL.
Proof. Admissibility of weakening is proved by induction on the depth of the
derivation, while that of contraction follows from the general criteria in [16,
Thm. 16] resp. [15, Thm. 2.5.5] since the rule set GbMDL is contraction closed
and already contains the modified versions of T and the propositional rules. ⊓⊔
Thus suffices to consider set-based sequents, i.e., tuples of sets of formulae
instead of multisets. The rules of GbMDL are adapted to the set-based setting in
the standard way. Since boxed formulae are always copied into the premisses of
a rule, the proof search procedure needs to include loop checking to avoid infinite
branches in the search tree. We do this using histories, i.e., lists of (set-based)
sequents, where the last element is interpreted as the current sequent:
Definition 2 (Histories). A history H is a finite list [Γ1 ⇒ ∆1; . . . ;Γn ⇒ ∆n]
of set-based sequents, where we write lastL(H) (resp. lastR(H)) for Γn (resp.
∆n) and last(H) for lastL(H) ⇒ lastR(H). Given another history H′ = [Σ1 ⇒
Π1; . . . ;Σm ⇒ Πm] with n ≤ m we write H 4 H′ if for all i ≤ n we have
Γi = Σi and ∆i = Πi. Finally, we write H++H′ for the concatenation of the
two histories.
The proof search procedure for GbMDL is given in Algorithm 1, where following
[10] we call the propositional rules together with the rule T the static rules,
Mon, 4,D1,D2 are called transitional rules. The algorithm saturates the current
sequent under backwards applications of the one-premiss static rules, and then
checks whether the result is an initial sequent or could have been derived by a
two-premiss static rule or a dynamic rule. The histories are used to prevent the
procedure from exploring a sequent twice (modulo weakening).
Lemma 2 (Termination). The proof search procedure terminates.
Proof. Given a history H, the number N of different set-based sequents which
can be constructed from subformulae of the sequent last(H) is exponential in the
size of last(H). Hence after at most N -many recursive calls of the procedure the
subroutine rejects every rule application. Furthermore, for every sequent there
are only finitely many possible (backwards) applications of a rule from GbMDL,
so the subroutine is executed only a finite number of times. ⊓⊔
Proposition 1. ⊢GbMDL Γ ⇒ ∆ iff the procedure accepts [Γ ⇒ ∆].
Proof. If the procedure accepts the input, then we construct a derivation of
Γ ⇒ ∆ in GbMDL by following the accepting choices of backwards applications
of the rules, and labelling the nodes in the derivation with the sequents last(H)
for the histories H given as input to the recursive calls of the algorithm.
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Algorithm 1: The proof search procedure for GbMDL
Input: A history H
Output: Is last(H) derivable in GbMDL given the history H?
1 Saturate last(H) under the one-premiss static rules;
2 if last(H) is an initial sequent then
3 accept the history
4 else
5 for every possible application of a two-premiss static rule to last(H) do
6 for every premiss Σ ⇒ Π of this application do
7 recursively call the proof search procedure with input H++[Σ ⇒ Π ];
8 accept the application if each of these calls accepts
9 for every possible application of a transitional rule to last(H) do
10 for every premiss Σ ⇒ Π of this application do
11 if there is an H′ 4 H with Σ ⊆ lastL(H
′) and Π ⊆ lastR(H
′) then
12 reject the premiss
13 else
14 call the proof search procedure with input H++[Σ ⇒ Π ];
15 accept the premiss if this call accepts
16 accept the rule application if each of the premisses is accepted
17 accept the history if at least one of the possible applications is accepted
Conversely, if the set-based sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable in GbMDL, then by
admissibility of Weakening there is a minimal derivation of it, i.e., a derivation
in which no branch contains two set-based sequents Σ ⇒ Π and Ω ⇒ Θ such
that Σ ⇒ Π occurs on the path between Ω ⇒ Θ and the root, and such that
Ω ⊆ Σ and Θ ⊆ Π . By induction on the depth of such a minimal derivation it
can then be seen that the procedure accepts the input [Γ ⇒ ∆]. ⊓⊔
3.1 Inner and Outer Consistency
Having extracted a cut-free calculus from the axioms using the method in [15,16],
soundness and completeness w.r.t. bMDL follow by construction (Thm. 2). By
the subformula property we then obtain the inner consistency of the logic bMDL,
i.e., the fact that ⊥ is not a theorem of the logic. This is one of the most basic
requirements that our logic should satisfy. But since bMDL was introduced with
the purpose of simulating Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ reasoning, it should also be consistent with
respect to the examples considered by the Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors such as the S´yena
sacrifice, i.e., it should not enable us to derive a contradiction from the formali-
sations of these examples. We capture this in the notion of outer consistency or
consistency in presence of global assumptions. To make this precise we consider
the consequence relation associated with the logic bMDL and the corresponding
relation associated with the calculus GbMDL. Henceforth we denote by A any set
of formulae of bMDL.
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Definition 3. The usual notion of derivability of a formula ϕ from a set A of
assumptions in bMDL is denoted by A ⊢bMDL ϕ. Similarly, for a set S of sequents,
a sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ is derivable from S in GbMDLCut if there is a derivation of
Γ ⇒ ∆ in GbMDL with leaves labelled with initial sequents, zero-premiss rules or
sequents from S. We then write A ⊢bMDL ϕ resp. S ⊢GbMDLCut Γ ⇒ ∆.
Theorem 2 (Soundness and Completeness). For all sets S of sequents and
sequents Γ ⇒ ∆ we have:
S ⊢GbMDLCut Γ ⇒ ∆ iff {
∧
Σ →
∨
Π | Σ ⇒ Π ∈ S} ⊢bMDL
∧
Γ →
∨
∆ .
Proof. The corresponding standard results for the propositional calculi transfer
readily to the system bMDL and the Gentzen system G3 with the zero-premiss
rules
⇒ θ
for each modal axiom schema θ of bMDL. The result then follows
from interderivability of these rules with the modal rules from GbMDL [15,16].
As an example, the derivation of the zero-premiss rule for Axiom (2), where α
denotes (ψ → ¬ϕ)→ ¬(O(ϕ/θ) ∧O(ψ/θ)), is as follows
D1....
(ψ → ¬ϕ), ψ, ϕ⇒ (ψ → ¬ϕ), θ ⇒ θ
ax.
(ψ → ¬ϕ), θ ⇒ θ
ax.
O(ψ/θ),O(ϕ/θ),O(ϕ/θ) ∧ O(ψ/θ),(ψ → ¬ϕ)⇒ α,¬(O(ϕ/θ) ∧ O(ψ/θ))
D2
⇒ α
prop.
where the double line denotes multiple applications of the propositional rules
and the derivation D1 is
ψ → ¬ϕ,(ψ → ¬ϕ), ψ, ϕ⇒ ψ
ax.
¬ϕ, ψ → ¬ϕ,(ψ → ¬ϕ), ψ, ϕ⇒ ϕ
ax.
¬ϕ, ψ → ¬ϕ,(ψ → ¬ϕ), ψ, ϕ⇒
¬⇒
ψ → ¬ϕ,(ψ → ¬ϕ), ψ, ϕ⇒
→⇒
(ψ → ¬ϕ), ψ, ϕ⇒
T
⊓⊔
Corollary 1. The logic bMDL is consistent, i.e., ⊥ 6∈ bMDL. ⊓⊔
Proof. Follows by Thm. 2.1 and the fact that the rules of GbMDL satisfy the
subformula property. ⊓⊔
Definition 4. bMDL enjoys outer consistency with respect to A if A 6⊢bMDL ⊥
By Thm. 2 this condition is equivalent to { ⇒ ϕ | ϕ ∈ A} 6⊢GbMDLCut ⇒ ⊥. We
now show that bMDL allows us to consistently formalise the seemingly conflicting
statements of the S´yena sacrifice. The proof uses the proof search procedure given
in Algorithm 1 and the following version of the deduction theorem (see Section
5 for a semantic proof).
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Theorem 3. For every sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ and set A of formulae the following are
equivalent (writing A for {ϕ | ϕ ∈ A} taken as a multiset):
1. { ⇒ ϕ | ϕ ∈ A} ⊢GbMDLCut Γ ⇒ ∆
2. { ⇒ ϕ | ϕ ∈ A} ⊢GbMDLCut Γ ⇒ ∆
3. ⊢GbMDL A, Γ ⇒ ∆.
Proof. 1→ 2: Easily follows by using the rules T and Cut.
2→ 3: Since every rule in GbMDL copies all boxed formulae in the antecedent
from conclusion to premisses, the result of adding the formulae {ϕ | ϕ ∈ A}
to the antecedents of every sequent occurring in the derivation of Γ ⇒ ∆ from
{ϕ | ϕ ∈ A} is still a derivation. As this turns every assumption ⇒ ϕ into
the derivable sequent A ⇒ ϕ, the result is a derivation without assumptions.
Statement 3 now follows using Cut Elimination (Thm. 1).
3→ 1: Easily follows by using the rules 4 and Cut. ⊓⊔
Thus in order to check whether bMDL enjoys outer consistency w.r.t. a set
A of formulae it is sufficient to check that the sequent A⇒ ⊥ is not derivable
in GbMDL. Before we formalise the S´yena sacrifice, let us remark that while the
operatorO(·/·) only captures conditional obligations, we would also like to reason
about unconditional obligations, i.e., obligations which always have to be fulfilled.
We formalise such obligations in the standard way by O(·/⊤). A formula O(ϕ/⊤)
then can be read as “it is obligatory that ϕ provided anything is the case”, and
thus models an unconditional obligation. A formalisation of the problematic
situation in the S´yena example (sentences A. and B. in Sec. 2) then is:
1. O(¬hrm/⊤) for “One should not perform violence on any living being”
2. O(sy/des hrm en) for “If you desire to harm your enemy you should perform
the S´yena”
3. hrm en→ hrm for “harming the enemy entails harming a living being”
4. sy→ hrm en for “performing the S´yena entails harming the enemy”.
with the variables hrm for “performing violence on any living being”, sy for “per-
forming the S´yena sacrifice”, hrm en for “harming your enemy”, and des hrm en
for “desiring to harm your enemy”.
Theorem 4. bMDL enjoys outer consistency w.r.t. the S´yena sacrifice, i.e.:
{
hrm en→ hrm, sy→ hrm en, O(¬hrm/⊤), O(sy/des hrm en)
}
6⊢bMDL ⊥ .
Proof. By Thm. 2 and Thm. 3 it is sufficient to show that the sequent
(hrm en→ hrm),(sy→ hrm en),O(¬hrm/⊤),O(sy/des hrm en)⇒ ⊥
is not derivable in GbMDL. This is done in the standard way by (a bit tediously)
performing an exhaustive proof search following the procedure in Algorithm 1.
⊓⊔
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4 Semantics of bMDL
The semantics for bMDL is build on the standard semantics for modal logic S4,
i.e., Kripke-frames with transitive and reflexive accessibility relation [2]. The
additional modality O is captured using neighbourhood semantics [4], which we
modify to take into account only accessible worlds. Intuitively, the neighbour-
hood map singles out a set of deontically acceptable sets of accessible worlds for
certain possible situations, i.e., sets of accessible worlds. As usual, if R ⊆W ×W
is a relation and w ∈ W , we write R[w] for {v ∈ W | wRv}. Also, for a set X
we write Xc for the complement of X (relative to an implicitly given set).
Definition 5. A Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯-frame (or briefly: m-frame) is a triple (W,R, η) con-
sisting of a non-empty set W of worlds or states, an accessibility relation
R ⊆W ×W and a map η :W → P(P(W )× P(W )) such that:
1. R is transitive and reflexive;
2. if (X,Y ) ∈ η(w), then X ⊆ R[w] and Y ⊆ R[w];
3. if (X,Z) ∈ η(w) and X ⊆ Y ⊆ R[w], then also (Y, Z) ∈ η(w);
4. (∅, X) /∈ η(w);
5. if (X,Y ) ∈ η(w), then (Xc ∩R[w], Y ) /∈ η(w).
A Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯-model (or m-model) is a m-frame with a valuation σ : W →
P(Var).
Intuitively, Condition 1 in Def. 5 corresponds to axioms (4) and (T) of S4,
Condition 2 ensures that only accessible worlds influence the truth of a formula
O(ϕ/ψ) and comes from the rules (Mon) and (Cg), Condition 3 corresponds to
the rule (Mon), while Conditions 4 resp. 5 correspond to (D1) resp. (D2).
Definition 6 (Satisfaction, truth set). Let M = (W,R, η), σ be a m-model.
The truth set JϕKM of a formula ϕ in M is defined recursively by
1. JpKM := {w ∈ W | p ∈ η(w)}
2. JϕKM := {w ∈M | R[w] ⊆ JϕKM}
3. JO(ϕ/ψ)KM := {w ∈ W | (JϕKM ∩R[w], JψKM ∩R[w]) ∈ η(w)}
and the standard clauses for the boolean connectives. We omit the subscript M if
the m-model is clear from the context, and we write M, w  ϕ for w ∈ JϕKM. A
formula ϕ is valid in a m-model M if for all worlds w of M we have M, w  ϕ.
Note that in clause 3 we slightly deviate from the standard treatment in that
we restrict the attention to worlds accessible from the current world.
Lemma 3. For all rules of GbMDL we have: if the interpretations of its premisses
are valid in all m-models, then so is the interpretation of its conclusion.
Proof. We show that if the negation of the interpretation of the conclusion is
satisfiable in a m-model, then so is the negation of the interpretation of (at least)
one of the premisses. For 4,T and the propositional rules this is standard.
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For the modal rules we only show the case of D2, the other cases being similar.
Assume that for the m-model M = (W,R, η), σ the negation of the conclusion
is satisfied in w ∈ W , i.e., we have M, σ 
∧
Γ ∧ O(ϕ/ψ) ∧ O(θ/χ) . Then
we have (JϕK ∩ R[w], JψK ∩ R[w]) ∈ η(w) and (JθK ∩ R[w], JχK ∩ R[w]) ∈ η(w).
By Cond. 5 in Def. 5 we know that (JϕKc ∩ R[w], JψK ∩ R[w]) 6∈ η(w), hence
JθK∩R[w] 6= JϕKc ∩R[w] or JψK∩R[w] 6= JχK∩R[w]. If the latter does not hold,
using this and Cond. 3 we have JϕKc∩R[w] ( JθK∩R[w] and hence we find a world
v ∈ JϕK ∩ JθK ∩ R[w]. Then with transitivity we obtain M, σ, v 
∧
Γ ∧ ϕ ∧ θ,
and thus the negation of the first premiss of the rule is satisfiable. Otherwise we
have JψK∩ JχKc ∩R[w] 6= ∅ or JχK∩ JψKc ∩R[w] 6= ∅ and again using transitivity
we satisfy the negation of the second or the third premiss of the rule. ⊓⊔
Corollary 2 (Soundness of GbMDL). For every sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ we have: if
⊢GbMDL Γ ⇒ ∆, then
∧
Γ →
∨
∆ is valid in all m-models.
Proof. By induction on the depth of the derivation, using Lem. 3. ⊓⊔
For completeness we show how to construct a countermodel for a given se-
quent from a failed proof search for it. For this, fix Γ ⇒ ∆ to be a sequent not
derivable in GbMDL. We build a m-model MΓ⇒∆ = (W,R, η), σ from a rejecting
run of Alg. 1 on input [Γ ⇒ ∆], such that
∧
Γ ∧
∧
¬∆ is satisfied in a world of
MΓ⇒∆. For this, take the set W of worlds to be the set of all histories occurring
in the run of the procedure. To define the accessibility relation we first construct
the intermediate relation R′ by setting HR′H′ iff (at least) one of the following
holds:
1. H 4 H′; or
2. H′ 4 H and there is a transitional rule application with conclusion last(H)
and a premiss Σ ⇒ Π of this rule application such that Σ ⊆ lastL(H′) and
Π ⊆ lastR(H′).
Intuitively, in 2. we add the loops which have been detected by the procedure.
The relation R then is defined as the reflexive and transitive closure of R′. To
define the function η we first introduce a syntactic version of the truth set nota-
tion:
|ϕ|W := {H ∈W | ϕ ∈ lastL(H)}
Now we define η :W → P(P(W )×P(W )) by setting for every history H in W :
η(H) :=
{
(X,Y ) ∈ P(R[H])2 |
for some formula O(ϕ/ψ) ∈ lastL(H) :
|ϕ|W ∩R[H] ⊆ X and |ψ|W ∩R[H] = Y
}
.
Finally, we define the valuation σ by setting for every variable p ∈ Var:
σ(p) := |p|W .
Let us write MΓ⇒∆ for the resulting structure (W,R, η). Then we have:
Lemma 4. The structure MΓ⇒∆, σ is a m-model.
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Proof. By construction σ is a valuation, R is a transitive and reflexive relation
onW , and Conditions 2 and 3 of Def. 5 hold for η. To see that Condition 5 holds,
we need to show that if (X,Y ) ∈ η(H) then (Xc ∩R[H], Y ) 6∈ η(H). For this we
show that whenever (X,Y ) ∈ η(H) and (Z,W ) ∈ η(H), then Z 6= Xc ∩R[H] or
Y 6= W . So assume we have such (X,Y ) and (Z,W ) in η(H). By construction
of η there must be formulae O(ϕ/ψ) and O(θ/χ) in lastL(H) such that
– |ϕ|W ∩R[H] ⊆ X and |ψ|W ∩R[H] = Y ; and
– |θ|W ∩R[H] ⊆ Z and |χ|W ∩R[H] =W .
Since both O(ϕ/ψ) and O(θ/χ) are in lastL(H), the transitional rule D2 can be
applied to last(H). Thus the proof search procedure either used the premisses
lastL(H)

, ϕ, θ ⇒ lastL(H)

, ψ ⇒ χ lastL(H)

, χ⇒ ψ
of this rule application to create new histories by appending them to H, or it
found a history H′ 4 H whose last sequent subsumes one of the premisses. In
either case for at least one premissΣ ⇒ Π there is a historyH′ s.t.Σ ⊆ lastL(H′)
and Π ⊆ lastR(H′) and for which proof search fails. Moreover, for this H′ by
construction of R we know that HRH′. Assume that Σ ⇒ Π is the first premiss.
Then ϕ, θ ∈ lastL(H′), and hence H′ ∈ |ϕ|W ∩ |θ|W ∩R[H] and the latter is non-
empty. Then in particular Xc∩R[H] ⊆ (|ϕ|W ∩R[H])c ∩R[H] = (|ϕ|W )c ∩R[H]
is not equal to |θ|W ∩ R[H] = Z. Similarly, if Σ ⇒ Π is one of the remaining
premisses we obtain Y 6=W . Thus whenever (X,Y ) ∈ η(H) and (Z,W ) ∈ η(H),
then Z 6= Xc ∩R[H] or Y 6=W . The reasoning for Cond. 4 is similar. ⊓⊔
Lemma 5 (Truth Lemma). For every history H ∈ W : (i) If ϕ ∈ lastL(H),
then MΓ⇒∆, σ,H  ϕ and (ii) if ψ ∈ lastR(H), then MΓ⇒∆, σ,H  ¬ψ.
Proof. We prove both statements simultaneously by induction on the complexity
of ϕ resp. ψ. The base case and the cases where the main connective of ϕ resp. ψ is
a propositional or  are standard (note that Alg. 1 saturates every sequent under
the static rules, i.e., the propositional rules and T, and that every transitional
rule copies all the boxed formulae in the antecedent into the premisses). If ϕ =
O(θ/χ), then by construction of η we have (|θ|W ∩ R[H], |χ|W ∩ R[H]) ∈ η(H),
and thus MΓ⇒∆, σ,H  O(θ/χ). Now suppose that ψ = O(ξ/γ). To see that
ψ does not hold in H we show that for no O(δ/β) ∈ lastL(H) we have |δ|W ∩
R[H] ⊆ |ξ|W ∩R[H] and |β|W ∩R[H] = |γ|W ∩R[H] . The result then follows by
construction of η and the definition of truth set. If lastL(H) does not contain any
formula of the form O(δ/β), then η(H) is empty and we are done. Otherwise,
there is such a O(δ/β) and the rule Mon can be applied backwards to last(H).
But then from the failed proof search for at least one of the premisses
lastL(H)
 , δ ⇒ ξ lastL(H)
 , γ ⇒ β lastL(H)
 , β ⇒ γ
we obtain a history H′ with HRH′ whose last sequent subsumes this premiss.
But then as above either |δ|W ∩ R[H] 6⊆ |ξ|W ∩ R[H], if it is obtained from the
first premiss, or |β|W ∩R[H] 6= |γ|W ∩R[H] otherwise. ⊓⊔
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Theorem 5 (Completeness). For every sequent Γ ⇒ ∆ we have: if
∧
Γ →∨
∆ is valid in every m-model, then ⊢GbMDL Γ ⇒ ∆.
Proof. If 6⊢GbMDL Γ ⇒ ∆, then by Lem. 2 and Prop. 1 the procedure in Alg. 1
terminates and rejects the input [Γ ⇒ ∆]. Thus by Lem. 4 and 5 we have
MΓ⇒∆, [Γ ⇒ ∆] 
∧
Γ ∧ ¬
∨
∆ and hence
∧
Γ →
∨
∆ is not m-valid. ⊓⊔
Since only finitely many histories occur in a run of the proof search procedure,
the constructed model is finite and by standard methods we immediately obtain:
Corollary 3. The logic bMDL has the finite model property and is decidable.
⊓⊔
5 Applications to Indology
We show now that despite being reasonably simple, bMDL is strong enough
to derive consequences about topics discussed by Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors (Example
1) and to provide useful insights on the reason why the seemingly conflicting
statements in the S´yena example are not contradictory.
Example 1. Consider the following excerpt: “Since the Veda is for the purpose of
an action, whatever in it does not aim at an action is meaningless and therefore
must be said not to belong to the permanent Veda” (PMS 1.2.1). In other words:
each Vedic prescription should promote an action. Given that no actual action
can have a logical contradiction as an effect, a logical contradiction cannot be
enjoined by an obligation. This can be translated into the formula ¬O(⊥/θ), one
of the forms of axiom D, which is derivable in GbMDL as follows:
⊥ ⇒
⊥ ⇒
O(⊥/θ)⇒ ¬O(⊥/θ)
D1
⇒ ¬O(⊥/θ)
⇒ ¬
A logical perspective on the S´yena controversy
In Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ literature many explanations of the reasons why the sentences A.
and B. in Sec. 2 are not contradictory have been proposed. We show that the
bMDL solution matches the one of Prabha¯kara, one of the chief Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors,
and makes it formally meaningful.
Consider the sequent in the proof of Thm. 4. Since it is not derivable in
GbMDL, using Algorithm 1 we can construct a model for the formula
(hrm en→ hrm)∧(sy→ hrm en)∧O(¬hrm/⊤)∧O(sy/des hrm en) (1)
However, to make the solution clearer, we define below a simpler model M0 =
(W0, R0, η0), σ0 based on Vedic concepts. The domain W0 is {wi | 1 ≤ i ≤ 8},
represented in Fig. 3 by circles. The accessibility relation R0 is universal, i.e.
for any 1 ≤ i, j ≤ 8 it holds that R0(wi, wj); it is not represented in the figure
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w1
w2 hrm
w3 hrm, hrm en
w4 hrm, hrm en, sy
w5
des hrm en
w6hrm, des hrm en
w7hrm, hrm en, des hrm en
w8hrm, hrm en, sy, des hrm en
Fig. 3. The model M0 for the S´yena controversy
for better readability. The map η0 is such that η0(wi) = {(X,W0) | X ⊆
W0, {w1, w5} ⊆ X}
⋃
{(Y, {w5, w6, w7, w8}) | Y ⊆ W0, {w4, w8} ⊆ Y }.
The figure represents only the elements of the neighbourhood of w1 that are
relevant to the valuation of our deontic statements. Each element corresponds
to a kind of arrow: solid arrows for the statement about S´yena and dashed ones
for the obligation not to harm anyone. An element of the neighbourhood is a
pair of sets of states, to represent it we draw an arrow from each state belonging
to the second element of the pair to each one belonging to the first element
of the pair. The function σ0 is the valuation of the model and it is such that
σ0(w1) = ∅; σ0(w2) = {hrm}; σ0(w3) = {hrm, hrm en}; σ0(w4) = {hrm, hrm en,
sy}; σ0(w5) = {des hrm en}; σ0(w6) = {hrm, des hrm en}; σ0(w7) = {hrm,
hrm en, des hrm en}; and σ0(w8) = {hrm, hrm en, sy, des hrm en}. Clearly M0
satisfies all the requirements stated in Def. 5.
The definition of M0 is based on adhika¯ra ([5], pp.147-155), a central con-
cept in Prabha¯kara’s analysis of the Vedas, which identifies the addressee of a
prescription through their desire for the results. In the prescription about the
S´yena sacrifice, the adhika¯ra corresponds to the desire to harm an enemy; the
results correspond to the fact that an enemy is harmed through the performance
of S´yena, and, more generally, to the fact that someone is harmed. Some com-
binations of these facts are impossible if we need to satisfy (hrm en → hrm)
and (sy→ hrm en), thus all the possibilities are the eight states in the model.
The accessibility relation accounts for the possible changes of subject’s condition.
The neighbourhood of a state encodes the obligations holding for that state, and
given that these obligations are the same for each state, the neighbourhood is
the same too. Thus the arrows show the changes of condition promoted by the
obligations.
We show now that the formula (1) is true in the state w1. First, all its
conjuncts without deontic operators are true in all states. Secondly, the for-
mula O(¬hrm/⊤) is true in w1 if (J¬hrmKM0 ∩ R0[s], J⊤KM0 ∩ R0[s]) ∈ η0(s)
holds for all s such that R0(w1, s). Given that ({w1, w5},W0) belongs to η0(s)
for all s ∈ W0, the formula O(¬hrm/⊤) is true in all states. For the formula
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O(sy/des hrm en) the valuation is similar. Hence M0 is a model of (1) and,
by Thm. 2 and 3, this provides a semantic proof of Thm. 4.
Among the different solutions for the S´yena controversy, the model M0
matches Prabha¯kara’s one which can be summarised in his statement: “A pre-
scription regards what has to be done. But it does not say that it has to be done”
(Br.hat¯ı I, p. 38, l. 8f). Indeed in state w1 no conflicting prescriptions are appli-
cable and all obligations are fulfilled. We call this a Vedic state. The existence
of such a state shows that an agent can find a way not to transgress any pre-
scription, and that the Vedic prescriptions do not imply that the S´yena sacrifice
has necessarily to be done. Our model also explains Prabha¯kara’s claim that the
Vedas do not impel one to perform the malevolent sacrifice S´yena, they only say
that it is obligatory, which was wrongly considered meaningless e.g. in [18].
Remark 1. Our analysis highlights that Vedic prescriptions are “instructions to
attain desired outcomes” rather than absolute imperatives. A Vedic state pro-
vides a way not to transgress any obligation, but at the same time there are
norms, e.g., the one about S´yena, for those who intend to transgress some obli-
gations, but nonetheless do not want to altogether reject the Vedic principles.
This is explicit in another Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ author, Ven˙kat.ana¯tha, who claims that the
S´yena is the best way to kill one’s enemy if one is determined to transgress
the general prescription not to perform violence. This feature suggests a possi-
ble use of suitable extensions of bMDL to reason about machine ethics, where
indeed choices between actions that should be avoided often arise. Consider a
self-driving vehicle that has no choice but to harm some people. There is no per-
fect solution but, nevertheless, the system should be able to provide instructions
that promote imperfect outcomes in order to avoid the worst-case scenario.
6 Conclusions and Future Work
We defined a novel deontic logic justified by principles elaborated by Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯
authors over the last 2,500 years, and used its proof theory and semantics to
analyse a notoriously challenging example. The fruits of this synergy of Logic
and Indology can be gathered from both sides: The vast body of knowledge
constituted by Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ texts can provide interesting new stimuli for the logic
community, and at the same time our methods can lead to new tools for the
analysis of philosophical and sacred texts. Our investigation also raises a num-
ber of further research directions, such as (i) a formal analysis of the concept of
prohibition as discussed by Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors. Moreover, (ii) among the about
200 considered4 nya¯yas (50 of which were on deontic principles), some hinted
at the need for extending bMDL in various directions: e.g., the principle “the
agent of a duty needs to be the one identified by a given prescription” (PMS
6.1.1–3) seems to require first-order quantification; some metarules that distin-
guish between different repetitions of the same action suggest the introduction of
temporal operators; finally the fact that S´Bh 1.1.1 asserts that the Vedas prevail
4 Not all Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ metarules have been translated from Sanskrit so far, see [6].
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over other authoritative texts suggests the need of a system to manage conflicts
among different authorities, a feature also important for reasoning about ethical
machines [3]. Finally, (iii) while the metarules considered for bMDL are common
to the Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ school, there are additional principles employed only by specific
authors. Their identification and formalisation might shed light on the strength
of the different interpretations of various Mı¯ma¯m. sa¯ authors and, e.g., help ar-
guing for the conjecture that Kuma¯rila’s interpretation is more explicative than
Man.d. ana’s.
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